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The gift of disaster: the commodification of good intentions 
in post-tsunami Sri Lanka 
Benedikt Korf, Shahul Habullah, Pia Hollenbach and Bart Klem1 
 
This paper analyses the commodification of post-tsunami aid in Sri Lanka, a process 
that ‘contaminated’ the ‘purity’ of good intentions with the politics of patronage and 
international aid. It argues that gifts are not just material transfers of ‘aid’, but also 
embodiments of cultural symbolism, social power, and political affiliations. The 
tsunami gift re-enforced and reconfigured exchange relationships among different 
patrons and clients in Sri Lankan communities, perpetuating the political economy 
that has driven social conflict and discontent in the post-independence years. Beyond 
dominant rationales of ethnic or political party patronage, the paper finds that gifts by 
disingenuous patrons not only became patrimonial, but that the patrimonial rationale 
emerged as much from above as from below—a dynamic that became nearly 
inescapable and self-reinforcing. Through three case studies, we explore the intricate 
chain of relations, obligations, and expectations pertinent in the co-evolving, but often 
contradictory, gift rationales that permeate the practices, performances, and 
discourses of tsunami aid. 
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Introduction 
In her foreword to Marcel Mauss’s seminal work entitled The Gift, Mary Douglas 
(1990, p. vii) writes that ‘though we laud charity as a Christian virtue we know how 
much it wounds’. ‘Pure gifts’, note Stirrat and Henkel (1997, p. 73), ‘are good for the 
giver but . . . bad for the receiver’. In fact, the aid in response to the Indian Ocean 
tsunami of 26 December 2004 could be seen as a paradigmatic case of gift—of 
charity, Christian caritas, a global form of compassion that transformed into a large 
and unprecedented level of donations from people living in Europe and North 
                                                 
1 Benedikt Korf is Associate Professor of Political Geography at the University of Zurich, Switzerland; Shahul Habullah is 
Senior Lecturer at the University of Peradeniya, Sri Lanka; Pia Hollenbach and Bart Klem are PhD students at the University of 
Zurich, Switzerland. 
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America to people affected by the tsunami in Asia and East Africa. In many cases, 
these gifts were given with the ‘pure’ intention of helping the victims. Yet several 
reports concluded that many recipients of such charity were not so happy with the 
process and outcomes of aid, or even felt humiliated and reduced to being passive 
‘victims’ (Cosgrave, 2006; De Mel and Ruwanpura, 2006; De Silva and Yamao, 
2007; Fernando and Hilhorst, 2006; Hyndman, 2007; Keys, Masterman-Smith and 
Cottle, 2006; Korf, 2005, 2007; Ruwanpura, 2008a, 2008b; Sarvananthan and 
Sanjeewanie, 2008; Stirrat, 2006; Telford, Cosgrave and Houghton, 2006; Telford and 
Cosgrave, 2007). 
The humanitarian imperative—‘the desire to prevent and alleviate human 
suffering wherever it may be found . . . to protect life and health and to ensure respect 
for the human being’ (ICRC, 1994; see also Hilhorst, 2005; Walker, 2005; Weiss, 
1999)—is still considered as the leading guideline. This paper, though, contends that 
the altruistic gift implied by the humanitarian discourse—which materialised in the 
form of post-tsunami aid—inevitably collides with divergent discourses, practices, 
and expectations associated with ‘gift’ when it enters a local domain. Aid becomes a 
culturally charged, political commodity. In other words, post-tsunami gifts—
seemingly altruistic acts of generosity—became entangled in the economy of charity 
and reciprocal obligations in the political economy of aid (Bastian, 2005; Korf, 2007). 
Or, as Stirrat and Henkel (1997, p. 74) put it with regard to charity in development aid 
more broadly, ‘[w]hat starts off as a counterpoint to the logic of the real world (gifts 
versus markets) ends up as part of that real world. The pure gifts become, in the end, 
the currency of systems of patronage’.  
In Sri Lanka, this entanglement of gifts in chains of reciprocal obligations and 
expectations has been quite pronounced. The country is a well-known holiday 
destination and was easily accessible for the media, foreign aid agencies, and 
volunteers that came in large numbers in the days, weeks, and months after the event. 
The incredible inflow of aid moneys, charities, professionals, and volunteers and the 
prolonged attention given to post-tsunami relief and reconstruction projects in Sri 
Lanka in the international media created what Jock Stirrat (2006, p. 11) has branded 
‘competitive humanitarianism’: competition was less about getting donations, but 
spending them by finding ‘marketable clients’: aid beneficiaries and photogenic 
projects. Aid agencies had to demonstrate to their private donors that their gifts were 
making a difference, that they were having a visible impact. ‘From the beginning, the 
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pressure was on the agencies not only to be effective, but to be seen to be effective’ 
(Stirrat, 2006, p. 13) (emphasis added).  
This paper explores and analyses the intricate chain of relations, obligations, 
and expectations that developed in the economy of private gifts supplied for the 
purpose of humanitarian assistance after the tsunami. Three small case studies trace 
the ‘biography’ of the gift in the situation of post-tsunami aid delivery and the 
intricate entanglement of various forms of gift in co-evolving, yet often contradictory, 
gift rationales. Our exploration is located in the perspective of an ethnography of aid 
(Gould and Marcussen, 2004; Korf, 2006; Long, 2001; Mosse, 2004; Olivier de 
Sardan, 2005; Rossi, 2004), which provides critical analyses of aid relationships and 
their matrices of rhetoric, ritual, power, and material transactions (Gould, 2004, p. 1). 
Indeed, we argue that gifts are not just material transfers of ‘aid’, but also 
embodiments of cultural symbolism, social power, and political affiliations. The 
tsunami gift re-enforced and reconfigured exchange relationships among different 
patrons and clients in Sri Lankan communities, perpetuating the political economy 
that has continued to drive social conflict and discontent in the post-independence 
years (Brow, 1996; Moore, 1985; Spencer, 1990). Our material, however, also 
pinpoints multiple patronage relationships beyond the realm of politics.  
 
Ethnographies of the gift 
Gifts given to humanitarian agencies are normally channelled through a chain of 
relations in the sphere of humanitarian aid. Donor and receiver are not directly 
interacting, but are different types of aid brokers (Bierschenk, Chauveau and Olivier 
de Sardan, 2002; Mosse and Lewis, 2006; Sǿrenson, 2008) that mediate the multiple 
interfaces (Long, 2001, p. 89) among donors, humanitarian organisations, and aid 
receivers. These brokers enter at various nodes in the aid chain and are both internal 
to the humanitarian agencies (as consultants, experts, project managers and 
volunteers, for example) and external to it (as local bureaucrats who channel the 
distribution of aid, as local politicians who cater for their electoral clientele, or as 
other agents of a local or national elite that attempt to tap into the resources). Gift 
relations and their economy of obligations and reciprocity are not confined therefore 
to the relationship between Northern donors and Southern receivers, but are 
constituted by a far more complex chain of relations, rituals, and practices that equally 
play into domestic patterns of patronage and victimisation. 
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We conceptualise the ‘biography’ of the gift (Stirrat and Henkel, 1997, p. 68) as 
a process of increasing commodification whereby the ideal of the gift as an ethical, 
disinterested act of generosity becomes polluted by the worldly practices of the 
mundane and interested world. Indeed, Marcel Mauss (1990) denounced the modern 
separation of interested and disinterested exchange into ‘economy’ and ‘gift’. Mauss’s 
point was that in the ‘primitive societies’ he studied, exchange was both interested 
and disinterested—gift giving was located in systems of exchange that involve 
obligations to give, to receive, and to return, thereby emphasising the relation 
between giver and receiver. He argued in particular that it is a modern conception to 
consider the gift as an interruption of ‘economy’.  
There has been considerable debate, though, on the universal applicability and 
the logical validity of Mauss’s concept of the gift (see, for instance, Derrida, 1992; 
Jenkins, 1998; Laidlaw, 2000; Levi-Strauss, 1987; Parry, 1986; Testart, 1998). In 
Given Time, Jacques Derrida (1992, p. 24) maintains that Mauss’s Essai sur le don 
talks of everything except the gift (cf. Jenkins, 1998, pp. 85, 87)—or the ‘pure’ gift, 
the gift as an interruption of ‘economy’. The pure gift denies reciprocity. But then, a 
pure gift becomes an impossibility as any act of giving is already entangled in 
reciprocal relations of obligations, return, and recognition. The problem with the pure 
gift, according to Derrida (1992), is that ‘as soon as a gift is knowingly given as a gift, 
the subject of generosity is already anticipating a return, taking credit of some sort’ 
(Barnett and Land, 2007, p. 1072)—a pure gift could not be recognised as a gift by 
another party (and thus, not even by the receiver). Indeed, Derrida (1992) asserts that 
there is no such thing as a ‘pure’ gift: it is not possible to give without immediately 
entering into a circle of exchange that turns the gift into a debt to return, an obligation 
to reciprocate.  
Arguably, the ‘biography’ of the gift traces the multiple chains of obligations in 
the system of aid delivery—from donor through brokers to receivers. However, while 
looking into the gift’s ‘economy’, we found discourses on gift giving as an ethical 
practice, as ‘pure’ giving—as separate from ‘economy’. These discourses uphold the 
notion of a pure gift. They are moralising discourses that lend legitimacy to the 
relationship forged between giver and receiver—at times with the help of 
humanitarian agencies or other actors, such as local bureaucrats, serving as brokers. 
 
Biographies of the tsunami gift in Sri Lanka  
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The tsunami occurred at a time when Sri Lanka’s peace process, which started in 
2002 after the conclusion of a ceasefire agreement between the government and the 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), was in stalemate. In spring 2003, the 
LTTE had withdrawn from the negotiations. In 2004, the eastern LTTE commander, 
Vinayagamoorthi Muralitharan, alias Colonel Karuna, had split from the movement, 
resulting in infighting within the LTTE and increasing levels of political violence. 
Tsunami aid became enmeshed in the politics of ethnic conflict and violence. Most 
notably, controversies arose about the appropriate ways of allocating aid to the three 
main ethnic communities (74 per cent Sinhalese, 13 per cent Tamils, and 7 per cent 
Muslims2; Department of Census and Statistics, 2006) and about channelling aid to 
rebel-controlled territories in the north and east. These discourses created a dominant 
dichotomy between the ‘south’ (Sinhalese) and the ‘north’ (Tamil) and focused on the 
administrative mechanisms needed to direct aid to areas under LTTE control (Bastian, 
2005; Frerks and Klem, 2009; Hyndmann, 2007; Uyangoda, 2005). As a result, they 
sidelined the concerns of the second minority group, Muslims, who already felt 
marginalised in the peace talks (Hasbullah, 2001; Lewer and Ismail, 2009; Uyangoda, 
2005, p. 343).  
In the patronage system of Sri Lankan society, so well explained by Brow 
(1996), Moore (1985) and Spencer (1990), aid becomes incorporated into the 
exchange relation forged between patrons (politicians) and clients (voters). Tsunami 
aid provided a rich resource for patronage and consequently, the gift was re-
appropriated. The patrimonial rationale with its mechanisms of inclusion and 
exclusion is a driving force of social conflict, political violence, and ethnic 
antagonism in Sri Lanka. While many observers hoped that the tsunami would create 
an opportunity for peacebuilding (as all three ethnic communities suffered), the 
tsunami aid that came to Sri Lanka in fact increased the gulf among the different 
communities and exacerbated the patronage rationale along ethnic lines (Frerks and 
Klem, 2009; Hyndman, 2007). 
While the dynamics of the peace process and the ‘ethnic conflict’ have 
dominated national debates on tsunami aid, at the local level, multiple patronage 
                                                 
2 These are the figures from the 1981 census; the 2001 census does not provide a comprehensive picture as it excluded some of 
the war-affected districts in the northeast. For reasons of brevity, the figure for the Tamils refers to the Sri Lankan Tamils only 
and thus excludes the ‘Indian’ Tamils, who constitute another 6 per cent. The figure for the Muslims concerns the ‘Moors’, thus 
excluding the ‘Malay’ who comprise another 0.3 per cent. 
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relations have had an impact on the gift economy. The tsunami gifts reinforced and 
reshuffled loyalties, group boundaries, and connections. In political patronage 
relations, gifts are supplied in return for votes (Case 1). But the patronage rationale is 
not confined to the realm of politics and to the local scale. Patronage rationales also 
permeate faith-based exchange relations between churches and believers (Case 3) and 
a multi-local chain of relations linking donors from Europe and Sri Lankan receivers 
(Case 2). The three case studies presented below demonstrate the convoluted 
processes through which a gift, local or foreign, considered as ‘pure’ ethical practice, 
ends up ‘in the real world’ (Stirrat and Henkel, 1997) of ‘dirty’ systems of reciprocal 
obligations. 
 
Table 1 Three gift biographies 
 Case 1: 
Maruthamunai 
Case 2: 
Baden-Württemberg 
Village 
Case 3:  
Akkaraipattu 
Location Ampara District 
(southeast) 
Galle District 
(south) 
Ampara District 
(southeast) 
Dominant ethnic 
group 
Muslim Sinhalese Tamil 
Politics Mosque federation versus 
Muslim party politics 
 
Multi-local patronage 
and Sinhalese politics 
Church politics and 
humanitarian principles 
Methods and 
material 
Participant observation 
(ongoing); 
interviews, group 
discussions 
(mainly with key informants 
and mosque leaders, but 
also with beneficiaries). 
 
January 2005– 
December 2006 
Participant 
ethnography: 
researcher was 
consultant for 
Diakonie—responsible 
for organising livelihood 
projects and the 
inauguration ceremony. 
 
May 2005–December 
2007 
Interviews; 
group discussions 
(with beneficiaries, aid 
personnel, key 
informants, and church 
members). 
 
July 2007– 
October 2008 
Lead researcher Shahul Hasbullah Pia Hollenbach Bart Klem 
 
This is illustrated by the political geography of our three case studies: two are in the 
southeast and one is in the south. Civil war affected Maruthamunai (Case 1) and 
Akkaraipattu (Case 3), both in the form of Tamil–Muslim antagonisms and violence, 
and in bloody fighting between government forces and the LTTE. Baden-
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Württemberg Village (Case 2) is in Galle District on the Sinhalese-dominated 
southern coast and is a major tourist destination. While these locations were not at the 
centre of combat, national debates on tsunami aid, of course, affected the discourses, 
practices, and rituals of the gift economy in all three settings. However, this was only 
one of a number of equally important discussions. Controversies concerning Tamil–
Muslim antagonisms, political favouritism by Sinhalese politicians, and alleged 
Christian conversion played a part as well.  
The three case studies are indicative rather than comprehensive. Each 
illustrates a particular biography of the gift and the inherent patronage relations. They 
draw on empirical material collected in different contexts as well as on interviews, 
group discussions, participant observation, and participant ethnography3 (see Table 
1). 
 
Case 1: from local generosity to competitive humanitarianism 
When the tsunami hit Sri Lanka’s coastline, Maruthamunai, a Muslim town on the 
war-affected southeast coast, suffered major devastation. Approximately one-tenth of 
its population died because of the tsunami. As the Muslim community received less 
attention in national debates on aid delivery, foreign aid agencies reached the Muslim- 
and Tamil-inhabited southeast coast only after some delays. 
Relief and rescue efforts immediately after the event involved many acts of local 
solidarity and pure kindness, often transcending ethnic boundaries (Harris, 2005). In 
Maruthamunai and its neighbouring settlements, Tamils and Muslims shared relief 
items and assisted each other with rescue and cleaning activities. They received local 
donations from people throughout Sri Lanka—from Sinhalese, Tamils, and Muslims. 
On several occasions, people told us stories like the following:  
 
the Tamil village of Kalaru, situated north of Periyaneelavanai and Maruthamunai, 
was cut off from the land route. Consequently, Muslims from Maruthamunai shared 
their own relief items with Tamils in Kalaru, transporting them by boat.  
 
                                                 
3 Participant ethnography builds on the material of developmental practitioners who reflect on their own involvement in 
developmental or humanitarian work and their observance of practices, rituals, and discourses while engaged in developmental 
work, including as a consultant or as a project manager. For information on the potential and limitations of this method, see Korf, 
2006; Mosse, 2004; Rossi, 2004; Sørensen, 2008. 
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Such narratives of kindness and solidarity indicate a ‘kind of give without take, 
generosity without expectation of any return’ (Clark, 2005, p. 385), borne out of the 
magnitude of the event, the scope of suffering—a type of pure gift. Indeed, the 
kindness appeared as a significant rupture with the widespread patronage and ethnic 
antagonism in the district’s politics—a disjuncture of ‘politics’. 
The mosque became a natural place of refuge for many displaced people who 
sought material and spiritual support. The mosque federation (palibail samasam)—a 
coalition of leaders from various mosques in Maruthamunai—organised the 
distribution of relief items, the burial of corpses, and the provision of temporary 
shelter (in mosques, schools, and other public buildings). It received food gifts from 
local donors within the community and from neighbouring communities, and it 
implemented a system of relief distribution that distinguished three categories of 
affectedness and defined the specific entitlements of each group. These strict rules 
were designed to institute transparency and accountability to the distribution of scarce 
relief items. The mosque leaders explained to us that they wanted to avoid falling into 
the trap of politics, favouritism, and patronage—practices common within the 
trappings of Sri Lanka’s welfare state and developmental aid. Gift giving was seen as 
a religious act of generosity that needed to be kept clean, ‘purified’, left free of the 
‘dirty’, mundane procedures of politics. And the mosque was the place to guarantee 
this purification.  
Immediately following the tsunami, relief items were in short supply. A few 
weeks later, Sri Lankan and foreign aid agencies and volunteers brought more relief 
items and aid money. As a result, the nature of gift giving and its handling changed: 
giving became competitive as the different aid agencies had to find the most viable 
and marketable (photogenic) projects on which they could spend their funds visibly 
(Korf, 2007; Stirrat, 2006).  
The change in the gift economy did not happen suddenly, but was rather a 
gradual process. In the beginning, the state authorities and the few non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) already present in the area continued to coordinate their work 
through the mosque federation. However, a rising number of new, foreign, and often 
inexperienced agencies largely bypassed the federation and distributed their relief 
directly to ‘suffering people’—frequently in conjunction with the media, which 
reported these gifts back to the public in the donor countries. These agencies operated 
in an increasingly competitive aid market and felt pressure to offer an attractive 
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package to beneficiaries in order to gain ‘clients’. This competitive humanitarianism 
aggravated a lot of social tension, discontent, and jealousy among the recipients of the 
gifts.  
Aid dynamics were further complicated by the government’s buffer zone policy, 
announced in January 2005, which required the relocation of all inhabitants who had 
formerly lived within a specified area along the coastline.4 All families that had had 
their houses in this buffer zone were eligible for a new house in a relocation site (see, 
for example, Hyndman, 2007). Because of this policy, large-scale relocation and 
house reconstruction activities commenced, including in Maruthamunai. With the 
start of these programmes, the gift became part of the system of patronage and mutual 
obligations in the fragmented Muslim polity of the area, as these relocation schemes 
provided ample resources for the patronage system of exchange relations between 
politicians and voters.  
The electorate expected their members of parliament (MPs) ‘to deliver’. The 
pressure on Ferial Ashraff, a local MP and the national Minister for Housing, was 
particularly high. Locals believed that as ‘the minister’ she should ensure that funding 
and land were available to her home electorate. Ashraff, though, was not alone in 
tapping into the gift market. Another local Muslim MP offered land in his native town 
of Sammanthurai to relocate displaced families from Maruthamunai—Sammanthurai 
had hosted these families immediately after the tsunami. This proposal created 
concern and resentment among local politicians in Maruthamunai who belonged to 
another political party. The latter thought that the MP from Sammanthurai had offered 
this land to expand his electoral bloc as voting for different Muslim political parties is 
largely place-based. Politicians from Maruthamunai did not want to lose votes and 
thus discouraged the families to accept the MP’s offer. Ashraff made paddy land 
available to end the stalemate, but this land had to be filled and elevated to be suitable 
for housing—a very expensive option, but one that allowed the families to be located 
near Maruthamunai (Hasbullah and Korf, 2009). 
The case of Maruthamunai indicates three realms of the biography of the 
tsunami gift: its religious, economic and political dimensions. Immediately after the 
                                                 
4 The buffer zone policy specified a ‘no building’ zone 100 metres from the sea in the south and west, and 200 metres in the 
north and east. The larger distance in the north and east was justified by the generally more extensive intrusion of the sea along 
this coast and the higher risk of cyclones. A new policy was launched in 2006 under the name of ‘Coastal Zone Regulation’, 
which introduced new zones. The minimum distance was now set at 35 metres from the sea and the maximum distance at 125 
metres, depending on the location, the physical environment, and damage caused by the tsunami. 
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event, the mosque attempted to create a space of anti-politics—the gift was 
considered as a religious practice, and it was to be kept pure, free from ‘economy’ and 
‘politics’. The inflow of foreign money and agencies changed dynamics and 
incentives in the gift economy and replaced practices and discourses of pure kindness 
and local solidarity. The gift became competitive in the evolving aid market. This 
commodification of the gift also saw the entrance of new kinds of brokers: 
consultants, foreign volunteers, and project managers with their own rationales and 
procedures that were largely shaped by actors from outside of Sri Lanka—private 
donors in the North expected to be shown the effect of their gift. When the housing 
relocation programmes started, the foreign gift was appropriated as a patronage 
resource within Muslim politics. 
 
Case 2: a ‘German village’ gifted to tsunami-affected families  
The post-tsunami gift economy developed a particular dynamic because new types of 
collective private donors in Europe—private companies and public and semi-public 
administrative units—collected gifts from among their staff or allocated 
organisational funds as gifts (Fernando and Hilhorst, 2006). These donors then sought 
to find partners who could implement their project ideas in Sri Lanka. 
In the German federal state of Baden-Württemberg, senior officials of four 
semi-public organisations pooled donations and formed a donor group called the 
Tsunami Relief Cooperation. The donor group wanted to implement a housing 
relocation project. Its four representatives all had long-lasting personal ties or 
organisational and political linkages with Sri Lanka. For example, the regional 
Ministry for Environment, one of the four donors, had been collaborating with the Sri 
Lankan Ministry of Development and Water Supply. The donor group utilised its 
relations with top-level Sri Lankan bureaucrats and politicians and signed a 
memorandum of understanding with the Sri Lankan government, thereby formalising 
the ‘German gift’ of Baden-Württemberg through a bilateral agreement. This 
memorandum allowed the donor group to sideline the bureaucratic and legal 
procedures implemented by the Sri Lankan governmental Task Force for the 
Reconstruction of the Nation (TAFREN), later the Tsunami Housing Reconstruction 
Unit (THRU). Local politicians helped to acquire ‘beautiful sites’ in the Galle region, 
which served the purpose of the project idea of building eco-friendly houses in a 
liveable environment. 
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The German donors soon realised that they did not have adequate capacities to 
implement the housing programme. Consequently, they drew on personal relations in 
their home country, Baden-Württemberg, to identify a professional broker, an aid 
agency, to implement the housing project. Some ministry officials and the 
representative of the Rotary Club had strong personal ties with the German Protestant 
aid organisation, Diakonie. Diakonie (whose headquarters is in the capital of Baden-
Württemberg) was reluctant at first to accept the mandate, but it finally agreed. A 
leading Diakonie official told us that because of the high profile of the people 
involved, ‘there was no way to disclaim the project any longer’. Diakonie depended 
on the goodwill of influential people within the donor group for future funding and 
cooperation. 
Diakonie started implementing the ‘Baden-Württemberg Village’ in early 
2006, when Galle District, where the relocation site was located, was experiencing 
increased competition among different aid agencies for access to relocation sites and 
beneficiary lists. This competition created a number of tensions among different 
agencies, as well as among foreign aid professionals and Sri Lankan bureaucrats (who 
were considered to be slowing down the pace of implementation) and the large 
numbers of potential beneficiaries who became increasingly frustrated with slow 
progress in house construction. Sri Lankan friends felt obliged to support their 
German counterparts. Several political party officials wrote recommendation letters 
and made their influence felt with local governmental authorities to speed up certain 
decisions, such as on the allocation of sites, on the recognition of land titles, and on 
obtaining an exemption for value-added tax (VAT). Diakonie formally followed 
official procedures, but the ‘recommendations’ and ‘persuasions’ helped it to resolve 
its concerns much faster than a number of other aid agencies that did not have such 
political networks. 
In the donors’ home constituency in Baden-Württemberg, the ‘Sri Lanka 
project’ received mounting criticism. The Ministry of Environment was challenged in 
the regional parliament. The donor group urged Diakonie to bring the project to 
completion and to conduct an inauguration ceremony to demonstrate visibly its 
success. The donor group decided that the opening ceremony should be held in July 
2007, during the German vacation season, so that the donor representatives and their 
families could travel to Sri Lanka easily. The donor group insisted on the erection of 
street name signs such as Stuttgart Para (street), Rotary Road, Speidel Pedesa (small 
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street), and Neckar Padipela (stairs)—all related to Baden-Württemberg or to the 
donor representatives’ organisation.  
The ceremonial set-up was a great concern for the donor group, too. It insisted 
on the hoisting of the German, Sri Lankan, and Baden Württemberg flags, 
accompanied by each country’s national anthem. Each donor wanted to deliver a 
speech, which generated tensions regarding who was to speak when. One donor 
claimed: ‘as we donated more money we should have the right to speak first and 
longer’. Several artistic performances were to take place, such as by a choir or a 
dancing group—‘something from the local culture’. Diakonie headquarters’ officials 
wanted to use the ceremony to demonstrate peaceful harmony in the village and 
among ethnic communities in the region, instructing the local Diakonie office to 
invite and ensure the presence of religious leaders of all ethnic groups at the 
ceremony.  
State officials, including the Government Agent (GA) from Galle District, and 
local politicians, while exerting their influence and power to speed up project 
implementation, used the ‘Baden-Württemberg Village’ as a model case to make 
evident their political effectiveness. The GA publicly announced that ‘this is the best 
housing project in the Galle region’. The ‘German gift’ thereby entered into Galle’s 
dynamics of political appropriation and patronage. When, in early July, the GA 
noticed delays in road construction, he personally ordered the Road Development 
Authority (RDA) to prepare the roads for a high profile visit by Germany and 
Colombo. The inauguration ceremony and the noticeable political interference in its 
implementation demonstrated that the housing scheme had gained strong political 
backing. In the eyes of the recipients of one house, this scheme was ‘special’—some 
said that they had the best housing scheme in the area.  
Case 2 shows two inter-related discourses and practices at work. On the one 
hand, the German donors wanted to invigorate a ‘German’ gift—with German 
credentials (eco-friendly, for instance). They visibly inaugurated the gift and 
communicated the generosity back to audiences at home in Baden-Württemberg. 
Diakonie, the aid broker, attempted to rescue the inauguration of the gift from worldly 
and mundane elements—the inauguration should become a celebration of peace, of 
the common good, an interruption to Sri Lanka’s messy politics of conflict and 
antagonism. It was designed as a celebration of a ‘pure’ gift, but by commemorating 
the gift, presumed ‘purity’ became impossible. On the other hand, local politicians 
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and bureaucrats transformed the gift into a political resource, embedding it in the 
reciprocal networks of obligations. Thereby, the ‘German gift’ became re-
appropriated as a patronage resource in local politics. Both elements of the gift, 
however, were co-evolving: the ‘German gift’ and the patronage gift each had their 
own rationale, ritual(s), and recipients. 
 
Case 3: religious patrimonialism in Akkaraipattu  
This third case involved the neighbourhood of Akkaraipattu, a coastal town in 
Ampara District in the east with some 60,000 inhabitants. Traditional caste, kudi 
(matriclans), and dowry systems are still an everyday reality in Akkaraipattu 
(McGilvray, 2008). The study explored the relocation programme for the inhabitants 
of Sinna Muhattuvaram, a small settlement (1,100 people) just south of Akkaraipattu. 
It lies on a narrow coastal strip between the lagoon and the sea and thus the tsunami 
almost completely washed it away. Its inhabitants are mostly low-caste Tamils (and 
some Burghers) who are either Hindu or belong to the Catholic or Methodist Church. 
They could not resume life in Sinna Muhattuvaram after the tsunami, because most of 
the village lies inside the buffer zone. The Divisional Secretary (DS) took vital 
decisions about planning and coordination of the relocation scheme. He selected three 
organisations to implement the relocation and allocated beneficiaries to each of them: 
the Smyrna Fellowship; the Eastern Human and Economic Development (EHED); 
and the Methodist Church.  
All three organisations are explicitly Christian. Smyrna Fellowship is the aid 
channel of a US-based evangelical church and relies on private funding from a 
Swedish family.5 EHED is the well-established local developmental agency of the 
Catholic Diocese in Batticaloa, which has been working in the east of Sri Lanka for a 
long time and has a dense network of offices throughout the region. EHED is still 
embedded in the Church’s hierarchy, but operates as a professional developmental 
NGO with offices and cars. It receives funding through the Catholic Caritas network 
as well as from secular donors and governments. Compared to EHED, the 
developmental wing of the Methodist Church is more firmly connected to the clergy 
and congregation. The housing scheme discussed was operated through the Methodist 
                                                 
5 At the time of our research (2007–08), the Smyrna Fellowship was no longer present on the sites. Given its non-institutionalised 
nature, it was not possible to interview a representative and it was difficult to get more details on its views and activities through 
other channels. 
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circuit in Thirukkovil (south of Akkaraipattu) and was supervised directly by the 
priest.  
The Methodist Church and EHED were eager to represent themselves as non-
partisan. They explained that they assist Hindus, Muslims, and Christians, because 
need is their only valid criterion—they provide aid regardless of the recipient’s 
religious or ethnic affiliation. Both churches have a long history of offering help, 
education, and consolation to marginalised segments of society. Methodist informants 
were vividly aware of the views of their founder, John Wesley, who created the 
church to reach out to the underclass and underlined that ‘there is no holiness without 
social holiness’. Catholic priests emphasised that non-partisanship could be directly 
related to Jesus Christ’s and the Catholic Church’s teaching on caritas. Gift giving as 
a religious practice is deeply embedded in the Church’s networks—Caritas, for 
example, is a global organisation that channels gifts from donors in far away countries 
to Sri Lanka. Christian aid agencies were therefore quite accustomed to the dual 
nature of the gift as a religious practice and as a developmental resource, including 
the reciprocal relations between donor and receiver attached to it.  
Although connected to the church and its religious and ethical teachings, the 
developmental wings of the two mainline churches also operate within the modus 
operandi—networks, practices, and discourse—of the humanitarian sector. In their 
proclamations, Christian NGOs, such as EHED or the Methodist developmental wing, 
describe themselves as professional aid agencies, but working with the inspiration of 
Christian values, making them even more committed to charity and development than 
secular NGOs. However, the massive influx of funds after the tsunami created 
concern among Christian NGOs that the pressure to deliver could compromise their 
Christian values. The Office Manager of a Dutch Christian NGO in Akkaraipattu said 
that: ‘To the extent it was there previously, the tsunami and the subsequent aid rush 
destroyed all the Christian ethos . . . All organisations go through that boom and they 
are confronted with competition, spending pressure, audits and so on. It evens out the 
difference’. 
In Sinna Muhattuvaram, this tension emerged quite clearly. The three 
organisations accepted the division of labour decreed by the DS, which allocated 
houses irrespective of the religious identities of the future inhabitants. However, the 
recipients attached significant importance to religious identity and had clear 
expectations about their religious leaders and the way they handled gifts. While the 
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churches had long abandoned the idea of using gifts for conversion or as a patronage 
resource for their followers, their constituencies appeared to expect them to do exactly 
that. Christian respondents wanted their religious patrons to provide assistance to 
them. Informants living in the Smyrna section of the tsunami housing project 
complained that their own churches (Catholic and Methodist) had not helped them 
much, and what they had given came from foreign gifts. Smyrna, though, had done 
well. The receivers considered the church that had delivered gifts to be one that cared 
for them. Therefore, this church deserved their loyalty. One informant said: ‘The 
priest [from their original congregation] was worried people might join Smyrna, but 
no church came . . . If Smyrna builds a church, certainly we will go there. They built 
all the houses and the playground. Certainly, we will join’. Apparently, the villagers 
did not know that state officials had allocated the beneficiaries to the three agencies. 
Aid workers and priests of the Catholic and Methodist Church acknowledged the 
tension. The EHED Information Officer explained: ‘The Catholics expected us to help 
them, but actually we are not the ones to decide who helps whom. The DS does that’. 
The Methodist priests protested: ‘we did so much for these people, but they are 
complaining’. 
Inside the Methodist congregation in Akkaraipattu, faithful people were 
concerned that the priests were so involved in aid work that they were neglecting their 
religious services for their home congregation. As the congregation in Akkaraipattu 
town itself did not suffer much in the tsunami, priests were mainly helping other 
people. Prominent Methodist Church members said: ‘The people are busy earning 
money. They don’t think about Jesus. Christians have started a lot of NGOs. The 
fathers don’t have time for preaching anymore. They are busy doing NGO business 
and neglect visiting the houses and praying with the people’. These criticisms fit into 
a wider religious discourse of anti-politics that surfaced in the Maruthamunai case as 
well: worldly affairs are seen as temporary and inferior to the religious. Money and 
politics are key symbolic manifestations of the world and are viewed as dirty or 
sinful. From this perspective, the churches had transformed their religious service of 
caritas and gift giving into an NGO business, thereby becoming similar to secular 
NGOs.  
This case presents the story of the re-appropriation of the developmental gift 
in religious terms. Although inspired by religious faith and practices of caritas, 
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mainline Christian aid agencies nowadays largely operate using the discourse, 
practices, and principles of the developmental world. Paradoxically, however, 
religious followers expected their churches to use the developmental gift as a 
patrimonial resource for their own flock. This divergence of expectations created 
tension at a time when gifts were abundant. While the ‘pure’ gift as caritas—as 
religious service—has been an important Christian value, the expectations attached to 
the relational and symbolic meaning of the developmental gift differed among the 
Christian aid workers, who were often from the clergy and the Christian laity. Many 
tsunami victims from Sinna Muhattuvaram wanted their church to care for them 
first—to provide them with tsunami gifts. It was unreasonable to them that their 
church offered gifts to people other than those in their congregation.  
Their view suggests a sense of religious patrimonialism from below, where the 
gift becomes a relational object that binds the laity to the church. This mirrors the 
rationale of political patronage relations that bind politicians to voters through gifts. 
The mainline churches have been insisting that their gifts should go to all who are in 
need, regardless of their affiliation. While they can find justification in the Christian 
teaching on caritas, based on the notion of ‘pure’ religious service, these principles 
also adhere to the frameworks and guidelines of humanitarianism. But engagement 
with this kind of developmental gift brought the priests criticism, first because some 
of their own people felt that they engaged too much with the mundane and worldly 
affairs of the NGO business, and second, because other followers felt that the church 
did not do enough for them. 
 
The entanglement of the gift 
In post-tsunami Sri Lanka, the narrative of the gift has been permeated by 
development discourse, jargon, and rituals: all kinds of coordination meetings, 
terminology, minimum standards and principles, different project phases, beneficiary 
categories, the latest fashion of cross-cutting themes, and a continuous ‘stock trade’ of 
projects, target groups, aid commodities, budgets, contacts, and so on. These rituals 
and practices of humanitarianism blended with different gift rationales. What started 
as an otherworldly practice in the global North—as a ‘pure’ gift—ended in a chain of 
relations, obligations, and reciprocal expectations and the dirty world of politics and 
patronage. Table 2 summarises and compares the logic of the gift in its state of co-
existence as humanitarian gift and as patrimonial gift. These two spheres are, of 
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course, not separate, but entwined. The contradiction lies in divergent gift rationales. 
Different actors employ different strategies to negotiate, bend, or circumvent the 
contradictions between these gift rationales.  
 
Table 2 Humanitarian and patrimonial gift 
 Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 
Place Maruthamunai, Amparai 
District (‘east’) 
Baden-Württemberg 
Village, 
Galle District (‘south’) 
Sinna Muhattuvaram, 
Akkaraipattu, 
Amparai District (‘east’) 
Donor First local, then foreign German donor group Foreign 
Broker First mosque federation, 
then international aid 
agencies, then politicians 
Diakonie and local 
politicians 
Churches, Christian aid 
agencies 
Recipient Muslim Sinhalese plus a 
few Tamils and Muslims 
Tamils (Christian and 
Hindu) plus a few 
Burghers 
‘Humanitarian’ gift From non-political 
kindness to competitive 
humanitarianism  
The inflow of foreign 
money and agents 
disturbs the ‘non-
political’ space of 
kindness and fosters 
competitive 
humanitarianism  
 
The ‘German’ (eco) gift 
as symbolic domination 
Special relations 
between German donors 
and Sri Lankan patrons 
provide the ground for a 
very special ‘German 
gift’, which needs an 
adequate gratification 
ceremony 
The church’s 
engagement in the 
developmental gift 
Christian charities are 
inspired by religious 
values to care, but also 
demonstrate that they 
follow universal (secular) 
principles of 
humanitarianism (such 
as non-partisanship) 
‘Patrimonial’ 
gift 
Political contestation  
‘The minister’ needs to 
deliver the gift to her 
local electorate, but 
other politicians contest 
the move, wanting to use 
the gift to expand the 
realm of their patrimonial 
system 
 
The re-appropriation of 
the German gift as a Sri 
Lankan patrimonial gift 
Local and national 
politicians and state 
officials re-appropriate 
the meaning and 
symbols of the ‘German 
gift’ as an expression of 
their caring patronage 
The laity’s expectation of 
a patrimonial gift  
Some believers expect 
their clergy to provide 
caritas primarily to 
church members and 
others argue that priests 
have sacrificed their 
religious work for worldly 
NGO business 
 
The three case studies indicate how gifts given in situations of asymmetric relations 
create what Pierre Bourdieu (1990) calls symbolic domination: in extending a gift, a 
donor transforms his or her status in the relationship from dominant to generous. In 
accepting a gift, particularly one that cannot be reciprocated equally, the receiver 
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implicitly acknowledges the social order that made this gift possible—he or she 
becomes grateful (Bourdieu, 1990, pp. 98–110; Hattori, 2001). The recipients of 
tsunami gifts could express gratefulness, demonstrated in various ways common in 
the realm of humanitarian aid, including donation ‘hand-over’ ceremonies and the 
performance of dances, songs, and theatre plays as part of donor celebrations.   
The gift is also embedded in local systems of patronage, as local patrons re-
appropriate the foreign (humanitarian) gift, making it ‘their’ patrimonial gift to be 
given to their clients. Here, the receiver acknowledges the social order by accepting 
this kind of gift—and provides a return in the form of political support, electoral votes 
or, in the case of religious leaders, faithful following. However, several tensions 
emerged at the intersection of humanitarian and patrimonial rationales of the gift. 
Catholic and Methodist aid workers attracted criticism because they failed to deliver a 
gift to their faithful. Many believers expected the churches to transform a 
humanitarian gift into a patrimonial one (Case 3). Muslim politicians felt pressure to 
find appropriate land and housing for their voters, otherwise they could have been lost 
to competing patrons (Case 1). Gifts became patrimonial not simply through 
disingenuous patrons, but also via the penetration of patrimonial rationale dynamics 
from above and from below—the dynamic became nearly inescapable and self-
reinforcing. 
 
Conclusion 
The tremendous, destructive force of the Indian Ocean tsunami seemed to have 
created a moment of rupture, a break with the mundane world of politics. The global 
wave of solidarity and local acts of kindness in war-affected areas were often seen as 
opportunities to reconcile the divided society of Sri Lanka and to promote the peace 
process. However, this ‘gift of disaster’ vanished into the air. National contestations 
regarding aid distribution hardened the frontlines of the different political camps and 
ethnic communities and triggered the disintegration of the peace process (Frerks and 
Klem, 2009). The international NGO community became subject to vociferous attacks 
by the Sri Lankan media for failing to deliver the tsunami gift. The ‘purity’ of good 
intentions became contaminated in the local politics of patronage and the international 
gift economy. Indeed, Jacques Derrida (1992) has argued that the notion of a ‘pure’ 
gift is unfeasible: it is not possible to give without immediately entering into a circle 
of exchange that turns the gift into a debt, an obligation to reciprocate. 
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The humanitarian or developmental ‘gift’ is loaded with ethical ideals of 
otherworldly generosity, as an expression of religious practice, of global solidarity—it 
is a manifestation of the separation of ‘gift’ and ‘economy’—drawing a boundary 
between disinterested and interested exchange. In his study of the gift in ‘primitive 
societies’, Marcel Mauss (1990) suggested that gift giving has to be located within 
systems of exchange that involve obligations to give, to receive, and to return. The 
kinds of gift giving that Mauss described were embedded in social systems of 
prestations. Indeed, the French term prestation is closer to the idea of social welfare 
or insurance than disinterested generosity.  
Prestation is possibly a good term to describe the nature of what we have 
depicted as patrimonial gift: reciprocal obligations are articulated in patrimonial 
relations where both giver and receiver have specific expectations. The gift economy 
is not simply created by disingenuous patrons. Its patrimonial rationale permeates 
social reasoning from above and from below—it is almost inescapable. For instance, 
Muslim politicians provide gifts to ensure votes—potential voters expect their 
‘minister’ to deliver according to the very same logic of the patrimonial gift. 
Disjuncture occurs when giver and receiver follow different gift rationales. Faith-
based charities, for example, failed to respond adequately to the expectations of their 
laity who wanted the humanitarian gift to be transformed into a patrimonial gift.  
The idea of the ‘pure’ tsunami gift—to enclose aid in a space of ‘anti-
politics’—was surely naive in a society shaped by patronage rationale. The national 
debates on mechanisms to allocate tsunami aid to different communities and on 
political favouritism brought out the political patronage rationale quite clearly. These 
antagonising discourses and the seeming inescapability of patrimonial rationales 
penetrated and reinforced social divisions along political and ethnic lines and as a 
result, they contributed also to the social conflict and political discontent that 
undermined the peace process (Goodhand, Korf and Spencer, 2009).  
Our material, however, also suggests that in addition to these dominant 
discourses of patronage and ethnic communalism, several other patronage rationales 
pervaded the practices, performances, and local, often more silent, discourses 
associated with the gift, exacerbating social conflict and discontent. In the words of 
Mary Douglas (1990): charity wounds.  
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